We introduce a model of price competition with endogenous market transparency, where it is costly for consumers to get informed about the announced prices. We show that there is symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium with a monotonic relationship between the degree of transparency and intensity of competition. Interestingly, we find that there exist multiple equilibria with zero, low and high levels of market transparency with the high level of market transparency being the stable equilibrium. Once comparing the stable equilibrium with the welfare maximizing one we find that the private market solution entails excessive investments in information acquisition. That is, at high levels of transparency the gain of consumers from increased transparency is smaller than the loss in the firms' profits leading to decrease in total welfare.
Introduction
It is often argued that a high market transparency is desirable for society as it fosters competition. How exactly a certain level of market transparency is achieved remains typically somewhat unclear. In this paper, we propose a model where the level of market transparency is endogenously determined. Moreover, an implication of typical argumentation, of course, is that the higher the market transparency, the higher the social welfare is. Interestingly, we conclude the opposite; in our set up the socially optimum would require lower market transparency than the private market solution entails.
We put forward a standard model of price competition, where the consumers' behaviour is not captured by the demand curve. They can also decide to acquire information on announced prices. They get to know the prevailing prices only if they acquire the price information. Our model replicates the standard Bertrand competition case when transparency, i.e., the proportion of consumers who are informed, is at the highest level. With both informed and uninformed consumers the …rms'pricing is in mixed strategies. The novelty with respect to prior literature is that the degree of market transparency is endogenous as also consumers are allowed to behave strategically.
In our set up …rms compete in prices, produce a homogeneous good, and have the same marginal costs of production. It is costly for consumers to become informed about prices. A consumer who acquires price information can, of course, choose the lowest price o¤er. The higher the proportions of informed consumers the lower the prices are in equilibrium. Thus, those consumers who do not get informed also bene…t, but only on average. We show that there exists symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in prices with a monotonic relationship between the degree of market transparency and intensity of competition.
Most interestingly, we …nd numerically multiple equilibria with zero, low and high levels of market transparency with the high level of market transparency being the stable equilibrium. When comparing the stable equilibrium with the social optimum, it turns out somewhat surprisingly that the social optimum would require less transparency than there is in equilibrium. That is, there is too much private investments in information acquisition.
Of course, we are not the …rst ones to address market transparency. Varian (1980) is probably the pioneering study. In his model the consumers are identical, while we allow for heterogeneous valuations. There is also an old research agenda of increased market transparency leading to intensi…ed market competition (see Stigler (1961) ) as increased transparency improves the consumers' possibilities to choose goods with lowest prices. However, on the downside of increased transparency is the …rms' improved possibility for collusion in a repeated relationship as increased transparency makes it easier to detect any deviations from collusive pricing.
For recent contributions, see for instance Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001) and (2002), Nilsson (1999) and Schultz (2005) . While the prior literature has examined the e¤ects of transparency on pricing, intensity of competition and welfare we fully endogenize the level of market transparency by introducing the consumers'strategic behavior in an otherwise standard model of price competition. Moreover, our …nding of multiple equilibria of market transparency is new in the literature.
In search theoretic framework Lester (2009) To construct an equilibrium we assume that consumers use a symmetric mixed strategy. The …rms'behaviour is then necessarily symmetric.
De…nition 1 An equilibrium is a proportion 2 [0; 1] of observing consumers
and prices p 1 and p 2 s.t. no consumer wants to deviate and the prices maximize the …rms' pro…ts.
Price Competition: Symmetric Equilibrium
Consider the price competition where the …rms A1 and A2 announce their prices p 1 and p 2 simultaneously, and assume further that proportion of consumers observe the announced prices. In a symmetric equilibrium both …rms then get 1 2 consumers to start with, and they compete for the consumers. If the …rms compete in prices in a Bertrand-fashion it is clear that for > 0 there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for exactly the same reason as in the standard Bertrand-competition case.
There, however, exists a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies and that is what we construct next. The support of the mixed strategy F is a closed interval p; p and it has no mass points (see Kultti and Virrankoski, 2003 for the reasoning and proof in an analogous case). It is clear that the highest price is never higher than the monopoly price. Also, it cannot be lower since when 5 a …rm chooses the highest price it only gets the non-observing consumers and might as well charge them the monopoly price.
Assume that A2 uses F and that A1 chooses price p from the support of the mixed strategy. A1's pro…t is then
This magnitude must be constant for all p in the support of the mixed strategy.
In particular, it must equal the pro…t at the monopoly price p m = 1 2 . Notice that at this price F (p m ) = 1. Equating (1) and the pro…t of A1 at the monopoly price yields the following formula for the mixed strategy
To determine p notice that F p = 0. Now equating the monopoly pro…t and the pro…t at p yields the following condition
The sensible root is
as the other root is greater than the monopoly price. To summarize we have the following result:
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium where prices are on the interval p; p ;and where p = That is, when = 1 the lower limit p is at the competitive level with two …rms, and at = 0 the lower limit p is at the monopoly level of a single …rm.
Thus, we have a nice and smooth transition from the monopoly price to the competitive price in a duopoly when the proportion of the informed consumers goes from zero to unity. The intensity of market competition is thus increasing in market transparency and quite naturally consumers are then also better o¤ due to the lower prices. Let us next examine consumers'incentives to become informed about announced prices in the …rst place. 6 
Transparency in Equilibrium
Assume that consumers have to pay a …xed cost of to become informed about the …rms' posted prices. We want to …nd the equilibrium proportion of consumers who decide to become informed. In equilibrium the consumers must be indi¤erent between observing the prices and not observing them.
First we determine the expected utility of a consumer who does not incur the cost of becoming informed. He chooses one of the …rms at random and the expression for his utility is
The above expression gives the consumer's expected utility when the …rm has set price p which happens with probability f (p): In (5) 2 + 2 ln(1
Consider next the case when consumers can learn the announced prices. By paying a consumer observes the prices announced by A1 and A2, and then gets to choose the lower price, i.e., he gets to choose the lower of two identically distributed random variables. The probability g(p) that the lower of the two prices is p is
Now the expected utility of a consumer who observes the prices can be expressed as follows
By paying a consumer becomes informed about the prices and chooses the lowest one, i.e., price p: Otherwise the expression of the expected utility remains the same as in (5). After some rather involved but routine algebra (see 
In equilibrium a consumer must be indi¤erent between observing and not observing the prices which condition determines the equilibrium value of . That is, by equating (6) and (9) one should in principle be able to solve . It should not come as a surprise that it is impossible to solve such in a closed form. We solve the model numerically, and present graphics for the expected utilities.
Assuming that the cost of getting informed, , takes values in the set f0; 0:02; 0:05g we can plot (6) and (9) in the same picture. 
Welfare
To determine how the market equilibrium fares compared to the social optimum we postulate that the social welfare measure is the sum of pro…ts and consumer surplus. This is easy to calculate as proportion of consumers gets the expected utility in expression (9) and proportion 1 gets the expected utility in expression (6) . There are also two …rms both of which make the same expected pro…t which is the same as the pro…t at the monopoly price (since it belongs to the support of the mixed strategy). Formally, the social welfare measure is 2 + 2 ln(1
Which can be consolidated into the following form We …nd that for all positive values of (up to after which no one observes)
there is too much market transparency in the optimal private market solution compared to social optimum. The intuition behind this result is that for low levels of transparency the gain of consumers from increased transparency exceeds the loss in the …rms' pro…ts, as shown in …gure 5. However, at higher values of transparency the loss in the …rms' pro…ts outweighs the increase in consumers'welfare. The …gure shows that if at low levels of the slope of the curves representing the consumers' welfare is bigger in absolute terms than of …rms'pro…ts, then the situation is the opposite at higher values of transparency.
Thus, if the social planner assigns equal weight to the well-being of both …rms and consumers, then socially optimal level of market transparency is lower than that of privately optimal. Note also that if …rms'pro…ts decreased non-linearly in transparency, then the result would change depending on the relative decrease of the …rms'utility compared to that of consumers.
Proposition 4
The private and socially optimal levels of market transparency coincide only when the cost of getting informed is zero. For all other values of the optimal private market solution involves too much transparency.
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Conclusion
We have developed a model of endogenous transparency where it is costly for consumers to get informed about the prices announced by the …rms. We show that there is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium that we derive explicitly.
We demonstrate that there is a monotonic relationship between the degree of transparency and intensity of competition; the prices and pro…ts decrease from monopoly level to competitive level as transparency increases from zero to perfect transparency. It is clear that there always exists an equilibrium, if nothing else then an equilibrium where no-one acquires information. Numerical analysis reveal that there exist multiple equilibria (exactly three) with zero, low and high levels of market transparency. Zero and high levels of transparency are stable equilibria whereas the low level is unstable.
Quite surprisingly, it turns out that the stable equilibrium with strictly positive transparency entails higher than socially optimal level of information acquisition. The market solution features too much transparency. This …nding is contrary to the results in the papers mentioned in the introduction. It also runs counter to the often mentioned requirements to increase transparency in various markets, the …nancial markets being the leading example.
There are two reasons for too high transparency in equilibrium. One is that the agents'decision to acquire information makes price competition more …erce, and lowers the pro…ts of the …rms. As pro…ts are part of the welfare it may well go down. The other reason emanates from the fact that the analysis is of partial equilibrium type. In a general equilibrium model the consumers would also be the owners of the …rms and the …rms' pro…ts would be distributed to the consumers. Taking into account these general equilibrium e¤ects might well change the result. 
